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Abstract: In this article, I argue that faith’s going beyond the evidence need not
compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent
literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call
B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue
that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond
the evidence and still be epistemically rational.
Introduction
In the Preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
famously reports, ‘I have . . . found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to
make room for faith.’ Similarly, Kierkegaard contrasts using his powers of reason-
ing with acting by virtue of the absurd, noting that ‘The Absurd, or to act by virtue
of the absurd, is to act upon faith.’ Both of these authors suggest that faith is
opposed to epistemically rational attitudes: Kierkegaard contrasts having faith
with acting in accordance with reason, and Kant suggests that, at least in many
cases, faith is incompatible with knowledge.
These remarks hint at the famous problem of faith and reason. Speciﬁcally: it
seems like epistemically rational attitudes are sensitive to evidence, including
counterevidence. Yet it is essential to the nature of faith that it is resilient in the
face of counterevidence. Some have argued that, for this reason, faith is simply
irrational. For example, the New Atheists, such as Sam Harris and Richard
Dawkins, suggest that faith closes one oﬀ to evidence and argument, and this
leads to vices such as dogmatism and fundamentalism. Others, such as
Kierkegaard, maintain that faith is epistemically irrational but nonetheless valu-
able. However, suppose that we don’t want to say that faith is epistemically
irrational. What other options do we have?
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In this article, I argue that faith that p can be epistemically rational, even if it per-
sists in light of signiﬁcant evidence against p. To do so, I explore the relationship
between rational belief and rational credence and relate it to rational faith.
Speciﬁcally, I provide cases in which rational belief is insensitive to certain kinds
of evidence. I argue that these cases point us to an important distinction
between two types of evidence that I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I
apply this to rational faith, and argue that faith’s being insensitive to certain
kinds of evidence need not compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. One key
upshot of my view is that both rational belief that p and rational faith that p
come apart from one’s probabilistic support for p. Overall, this is my basic
argument:
() Rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence.
[premise, supported by contemporary epistemology]
() If rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence,
then faith is both (i) more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence
and (ii) rational. [premise]
() Faith is both (i) more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence and (ii)
rational. [, ]
() One way for an attitude A to ‘go beyond the evidence’ is for A to be
more sensitive to certain kinds of evidence than others. [premise]
() Thus, faith goes beyond the evidence and is rational. [, ]
This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I defend premise  by sum-
marizing some recent work in the literature on belief and credence. I explain a dis-
tinction between two kinds of evidence: B-evidence and C-evidence. In the
following section, I apply this distinction to rational faith and argue for premises
 and . In the fourth section, I describe a few generalizations and upshots that
emerge from my picture and conclude.
A few caveats before I begin: ﬁrst, the focus of this article is normative, not
descriptive. I am interested in rational faith (and rational belief and rational cre-
dence). Thus, I am not primarily concerned with providing a psychological
description of these mental states, but how these states function for a rational
agent.
What notion of rationality am I working with? Philosophers have noted that
there are many strands of rationality; some have suggested there are as many as
nine diﬀerent kinds. First, I am interested in epistemic rationality. This brings
my account of faith’s rationality in contrast with other accounts in the literature,
which have focused on the practical rationality of action-oriented faith. I am inter-
ested in the epistemic rationality of faith qua mental state, rather than the practical
rationality of faith qua commitment to act. Second, I focus on a speciﬁc strand of
epistemic rationality that describes agents with the same cognitive powers as us
who respond to evidence in an epistemically appropriate way. So, hold our
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mental processing power ﬁxed; I am interested in questions about how we should
respond to the evidence we encounter.
Finally, I am interested in propositional faith, or faith that some proposition is
true. Many maintain this is not the only variety of faith. For example, Robert
Audi () contrasts propositional faith with attitudinal faith (faith in a person
or entity) and volitional faith (a largely voluntary state of the will which disposes
one to act certain ways). Insofar as these varieties of faith are not subject to epi-
stemic evaluation, my arguments in this article are not intended to apply to them.
While I do not want to rule out the wider applicability of my arguments, propos-
itional faith is clearly epistemically evaluable, and thus I will focus there.
Belief, credence, B-evidence, and C-evidence
Belief is a familiar doxastic attitude; belief that p is taking p to be the case or
regarding p as true. Yet we are more conﬁdent in some of our beliefs than in
others. I believe both that  +  =  and that my car is parked outside, but I am
more conﬁdent in the former belief than in the latter belief. For this reason,
epistemologists have appealed to another doxastic attitude they call credences.
Credences are, in many ways, similar to degrees of conﬁdence. Credences are
much more ﬁne-grained than beliefs and are often given a value on the [, ]
interval. For example, I have a credence of  that  +  = , a . credence my car
is parked outside, and a . credence that a fair two-sided coin will land heads.
Rational high credence without rational belief
A topic of recent interest to epistemologists involves the ways that belief
and credence respond to evidence. In many cases where we gain signiﬁcant evi-
dence for some proposition p, we ought to both believe that p and have a high cre-
dence that p. I perceive a coﬀee cup on the table, so I both believe and have a high
credence that it is on the table. I hear from a reliable friend that the talk is at :
today, so I believe and have a high credence the talk is at :. However, not all
cases are like these. Sometimes, one’s evidence generates a rational high credence
but not rational belief. Three examples of these cases are as follows:
Lottery propositions: Suppose I have a lottery ticket that is part of a fair
lottery of  tickets. I ought to have a high credence my ticket will
lose (.). However, I ought not to believe my ticket will lose.
There are at least two arguments that I ought not to believe my ticket will lose.
First, if I can rationally believe my ticket will lose, and rational belief is closed
under conjunction, then I rationally believe the large conjunction that <ticket 
will lose and ticket  will lose and ticket  will lose . . . >. However, I also
believe the negation of this conjunction, since one ticket will win. Assuming it is
irrational to have contradictory beliefs, I ought to reject one of the above
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assumptions, and a natural assumption to reject is that I ought not to believe my
ticket is a loser.
The second is as follows: I cannot know my lottery ticket lost. Knowledge is the
norm of belief. Therefore, I ought not to believe my lottery ticket lost. Thus, it is
plausible that I ought to have a high credence in but not believe lottery proposi-
tions; my evidence that I lost the lottery is credence-justifying but not belief-
justifying.
A second example of evidence that is credence-generating but not belief-gener-
ating is from Lara Buchak (), as follows:
Naked statistical evidence: Suppose I am a juror trying to ﬁgure out which
bus company hit some victim, and % of the buses in town are operated by
the Blue Bus Company. I ought not to believe that the Blue Bus Company
hit the victim on this basis, even though the evidence justiﬁes raising my
credence (potentially even signiﬁcantly) that they did it.
Not only does Buchak think this is the intuitive reading of the cases, but it is also
justiﬁed by legal norms. For example, it would be impermissible to convict the
Blue Bus Company based on statistical evidence alone.
A ﬁnal case is from Martin Smith (), adapted from Dana Nelkin ():
Non-normic support: Suppose I have set up my computer such that the
background colour is determined by a random number generator, and /
,, times it is red; otherwise it is blue. One day I turn onmy computer
and go into the next room to do something else. I ought to have a very high
credence (.) that my computer’s background is blue, but I ought
not believe it is blue.
Smith notes, however, that if his friend Bruce wanders in and sees a blue back-
ground on the computer, it seems like Bruce can justiﬁedly believe the background
is blue. Smith uses the term ‘normic support’ to describe the kind of evidential
support Bruce has; Smith merely has ‘non-normic’ support for this proposition.
Smith maintains that what diﬀerentiates normic and non-normic support involves
when evidentially supported but false beliefs cry out for explanation. Speciﬁcally,
when we have normic support for a belief and the belief turns out to be false, we
seek some kind of explanation for why it is false. This is why, if Bruce’s belief that
the screen was blue is false, we would want to know why – was he hallucinating, or
suddenly struck with colour blindness? However, when we have evidence that fre-
quently but not normally supports some proposition, no such explanation is
sought. If Smith’s belief were false, we would not seek such an explanation.
Thus, when we have mere non-normic support for p, we are justiﬁed in having
a high credence, but not believing that p.
In all three of these cases, there is evidence that is credence-generating but not
belief-generating. These cases suggest that rational belief is not merely a matter of
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probabilistic support; whatever justiﬁes belief isn’t merely a high probability that
the believed proposition is true.
Another interesting feature of these cases is that there are close versions of the
cases that seem to generate both rational belief and rational high credence. In the
ﬁrst case, when I hear the winning numbers announced and realize they are not
my numbers, I rationally believe my ticket lost. In the second case, when I hear
a reliable eyewitness testify that the Blue Bus Company is guilty, I rationally
believe the Blue Bus Company is guilty. In the third case, Bruce rationally believes
the background is blue based on his perceptual evidence.
Why might this be? What kind of evidence aﬀects our beliefs and credences, and
what kind of evidence aﬀects only our credences? I will suggest a distinction
between two types of evidence that makes sense of the above cases.
B-evidence and C-evidence
What is the diﬀerence between evidence that is credence-generating and
evidence that is belief-generating? I submit that the answer has to do with the fol-
lowing distinction:
B-evidence: Evidence for p that does not make salient the possibility that
not-p.
C-evidence: Evidence for p that makes salient the possibility that not-p.
A salient possibility is a possibility to which an agent is rationally paying atten-
tion. To illustrate this distinction further, consider some examples. A common
way to get B-evidence is to get evidence that p is true without qualiﬁcation,
such as when someone asserts p. C-evidence for p includes statistical evidence
for p, and also includes evidence for p that is hedged or qualiﬁed in some way,
e.g., ‘P is decently likely, but I’m honestly not sure.’ Given this distinction, we
can explain the cases above in the following way:
() Rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence.
Note that () is the ﬁrst premise of our argument. Since the word ‘sensitive’ is
somewhat vague, we can clarify () in the following way:
(.) It is usually irrational to believe that p on the basis of mere
C-evidence for p.
(.) It is usually rational to believe that p on the basis of (good)
B-evidence for p.
Explaining the Cases
(.) and (.) explain why I ought not to believe lottery propositions, pro-
positions for which I have only statistical evidence, and propositions with mere
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non-normic support. It also explains why I can believe the relevant propositions in
the alternative versions of the cases mentioned above.
In the lottery case, I have evidence that directs my attention to the possibility
that I might win. I know that one ticket is going to win, and winners are celebrated
and given lots of attention. When a lottery ticket is in my hand, my evidence calls
me to pay attention to the possibility that I might just be the winner, so my evi-
dence is C-evidence. Since rational belief is not based on C-evidence alone, I
ought not to believe I will lose. However, if I am given B-evidence for the propos-
ition that I lost, I can rationally believe I lost; this happens when I hear the winning
numbers (that aren’t on my ticket). Thus, (.) and (.) can explain lottery cases.
In the statistical evidence case, the fact that  per cent of the buses in a town are
run by the Blue Bus Company is merely C-evidence that the Blue Bus Company is
guilty; it makes salient the possibility that another bus company might be respon-
sible. Thus, I ought not to believe the Blue Bus Company is guilty or convict them
on this basis. However, when a reliable eyewitness testiﬁes that they saw one of the
Blue Bus Company’s buses hit the pedestrian, I have B-evidence that the Blue Bus
Company is responsible, and ought to both believe they did it and (in normal cir-
cumstances) convict them on this basis.
In the non-normic support case, the fact that Smith’s computer background is
determined by a random number generator that makes it blue ,/
,, times is mere C-evidence that the background is blue. However,
upon seeing the blue background, Bruce has B-evidence that the background
is blue.
Thus, I maintain that the distinction between B-evidence and C-evidence plays
an important role in the relationship between rational belief, rational credence,
and evidence. However, while I have argued that my account can explain the
above cases well, I have not considered other accounts that may also explain
these cases. Thus, while I prefer my suggested account, I also think that the distinc-
tion between B-evidence and C-evidence could be spelled out in a more ecumen-
ical way. For example, consider the following chart:
B-evidence C-evidence
. Many cases of testimony and perception,
especially e.g. ﬂat-out assertions, clear
perceptions of medium-sized objects
. Evidence for p that would require an
explanation if p turned out to be false
. Evidence for p that doesn’t make salient
the possibility of not-p
. Evidence for lottery propositions
. Statistical evidence
. Hedged assertions
. Evidence for p that would not require
an explanation if p turned out to be
false
. Evidence for p that makes salient the
possibility of not-p
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One could deﬁne B-evidence and C-evidence as the items listed above (or a subset
of them); this would be less controversial, explain the cases, and apply equally well
to the problem of faith and reason. I will proceed on the assumption that my pre-
ferred account is true, but it is worth noting that many of the same moves can be
made while employing a less controversial version of the distinction.
Now, I will argue that the distinction between B-evidence and C-evidence is
important for understanding rational faith.
Faith, B-evidence, and C-evidence
A defence of premise 
In this section, I defend the second premise of my argument:
() If rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence,
then faith is both (i) more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence
and (ii) rational.
The idea behind () is that there is rational parity between faith and belief; if belief
can be more sensitive to some kinds of evidence than others and nonetheless
rational, then it seems as though rational faith can be similarly sensitive to some
kinds of evidence more than others.
To further defend and explain (), I will give four cases of faith that are struc-
turally similar to the lottery, statistical, and non-normic cases in the previous
section. If rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence in
these cases, then structurally similar cases of faith can be rational as well. Or so
I will argue.
Case 1: Sally knows (let’s say) that % of philosophers keep secrets. Sally is
considering telling Rebecca, her new philosopher friend, a secret, but since
Sally just met her, Sally doesn’t have faith that she is trustworthy. Sally
doesn’t have faith that Rebecca will keep the secret just based on the stat-
istic about philosophers.
Case  is structurally similar to the case of naked statistical evidence case. I cannot
believe that the Blue Bus Company is guilty simply because they operate  per
cent of the buses in town, and Sally cannot have faith that Rebecca is trustworthy
just because  per cent of philosophers keep secrets. However, consider a version
of the case on which Sally receives B-evidence that Rebecca is trustworthy, e.g.
Sally receives testimony from some of Rebecca’s friends that Rebecca is honest
and dependable, or Sally gets to know Rebecca and perceives these virtues in
her. Then, Sally can rationally have faith Rebecca will keep the secret. This
second version of the case parallels the case where I have testimonial evidence
rather than merely statistical evidence that the Blue Bus Company is guilty. The
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testimony (B-evidence), but not the mere statistic (C-evidence), justiﬁes rational
belief and rational faith.
Case 2: John does not have faith that God exists. He reads online about the
ﬁne-tuning argument, which purports to show that facts about the physical
conditions required for life make theism much more probable than
atheism. John ﬁnds the argument convincing, and raises his credence
that God exists; however, the evidence from the ﬁne-tuning argument
does not produce in John faith that God exists.
As in Case , Case  parallels the cases above in which C-evidence generates a high
credence that p but not belief that p. The mere fact that the ﬁne-tuning argument
makes theism probable does not justify John’s having faith that God exists.
However, suppose John hears his friend Sarah’s testimony. Sarah describes her
personal relationship with God and ways that God has helped her and cared for
her. After hearing Sarah’s story, John has faith that God exists. The B-evidence
that God exists from Sarah justiﬁes John’s faith that God exists.
Cases  and  directly parallel the cases of rational belief above, in which I have a
high credence in p but do not believe p. However, the distinction between B-evi-
dence and C-evidence also enables the generation of cases with the opposite struc-
ture: belief that p is rational, even though I get evidence that (even signiﬁcantly)
lowers my credence that p. For example, you might have an eyewitness testify
that the Green Bus Company is guilty, and then learn that the Green Bus
Company only operates  per cent of the buses in town. Similarly, I might per-
ceive the computer’s red background, and then learn that the background is deter-
mined by a random number generator which makes this extremely unlikely. In
both cases, the C-evidence against the proposition requires me to lower my cre-
dence in p, but I can nonetheless still rationally believe p. These cases are espe-
cially interesting when applied to faith, because they are cases in which
epistemically rational faith can remain steadfast in light of counterevidence. For
example:
Case 3: Billy is happily engaged and will be married soon. He has good evi-
dence that he and his spouse are uniquely sincere and serious. Based on
their backgrounds and personalities, he has reason to think that their
level of commitment is stronger than that of many other couples. Billy
has faith that he and his future spouse will not get divorced. Then, Billy
learns that half of all marriages end in divorce. Learning this statistic
does not aﬀect his faith that they will not get divorced.
In Case , Billy has good B-evidence that he and his spouse won’t get divorced. The
statistic (C-evidence) that Billy learns ought to count against this to some degree,
and Billy should lower his credence. Nonetheless, it still seems rational for Billy to
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continue to have faith that he and his spouse will remain committed. Thus, Billy’s
faith is rational, even upon his receiving the statistical counterevidence.
Consider a ﬁnal case:
Case 4: Susan, a Christian, has had many personal experiences of God
through prayer and liturgy. She has faith that an all-good God exists (call
this proposition G). She reads an article that presents the evidential
problem of evil; it uses examples of evil in the world to (purportedly)
lower the probability of G. Susan continues to have faith that G despite
her new evidence that lowers the probability of G.
In Case , assume that Susan’s religious experiences are evidentially signiﬁcant.
Then, Susan has good B-evidence for G. Susan then gets evidence that lowers the
probability of G. Getting this evidence might require Susan to lower her credence
in G, but in virtue of the fact that it is C-evidence, it does not ﬂat out establish that
the existence of an all-good God is impossible. Since Susan’s religious experiences
are quite evidentially signiﬁcant, Susan can nonetheless rationally continue to
have faith that G.
It is worth noting, however, that while rational faith that p is consistent with C-
evidence against p, it isn’t consistent with any amount of C-evidence against p.
Presumably, if the C-evidence were signiﬁcant enough to substantially lower
Susan’s credence (say, well below .), continuing to have faith may no longer
be rational. Uncontroversially, rational faith’s steadfastness will depend on the
weight of the evidence for and against the proposition of faith. However, the
point here is that the type of evidence also matters; rational faith is not a mere
matter of probabilistic support. Rational faith, like rational belief, can remain
steadfast in cases where it otherwise would not, if it is supported by good
B-evidence and has merely or mainly C-evidence going against it.
Thus, I maintain that if rational belief is more sensitive to B-evidence than to
C-evidence, then rational faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence
as well. The cases that support this thesis about belief can be extended to cases
of faith. In the same way that rational belief is not merely a matter of probabilistic
support, rational faith is also not merely about probabilistic support.
Another way of putting this point is that the Lockean view of rational belief and
rational faith is false. The Lockean Thesis, usually stated as a thesis about belief,
claims that S’s belief that p is rational iﬀ it is rational for S to have a suﬃciently
high credence that p. One could also hold a Lockean view of rational faith, i.e.
S’s faith that p is rational iﬀ it is rational for S to have a suﬃciently high credence
that p. I have argued that both of these versions of the Lockean Thesis are false.
One can have a high credence in p but not have rational faith that p, and rational
faith that p is consistent with a rational low credence in p.
We now have a defence of premises () and (), and therefore our ﬁrst
conclusion:
Belief, credence, and faith 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412518000446
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 73.144.84.180, on 07 May 2019 at 12:53:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
() Faith is both (i) more sensitive to B-evidence than C-evidence and (ii)
rational.
We can ﬁll out this account as we did with rational belief, with a similar under-
standing of sensitivity. That is:
(.) It is usually irrational to have (or lose) faith that p on the basis of
mere C-evidence for p,
and
(.) It is usually rational to have faith that p on the basis of (good)
B-evidence for p.
A defence of premise 
In this section, I defend premise () of my argument:
() One way for an attitude A to ‘go beyond the evidence’ is for A to be
more sensitive to certain kinds of evidence than others.
‘Going beyond the evidence’ is, admittedly, a phrase that is both metaphorical and
somewhat vague. However, I maintain that at least one way that S’s attitude A
might go beyond the evidence is that A is insensitive to certain parts of S’s body
of evidence. A paradigm example of an attitude that does not go beyond the evi-
dence is rational credence; S’s credence, if rational, tightly tracks the amount of
evidence S has for or against some proposition. Nonetheless, I have argued that
certain attitudes do not perfectly track evidence in this way, even though they
are rational. One may have a lot of evidential or probabilistic support for some
proposition and nonetheless fail to have justiﬁcation to believe it or have faith
that it is true. Additionally, one might have evidence that justiﬁes faith/belief,
and be justiﬁed in maintaining these attitudes even in light of counterevidence
that lowers (even signiﬁcantly) the probability of the proposition in question.
Once one sees that probabilistic support comes apart from what justiﬁes faith/
belief, it becomes clear that there is a sense in which both attitudes go beyond
the evidence. They remain steadfast as C-evidence lowers and raises the probabil-
ity of the relevant proposition.
Here, an objector might worry that, even if I have pointed out an interesting
sense in which rational faith goes beyond the evidence, my account also entails
that rational belief goes beyond the evidence. But that’s a somewhat odd sugges-
tion; prima facie, belief does not seem to be an attitude that goes beyond the evi-
dence. My response is as follows: if faith entails belief, this is not surprising. If faith
does not entail belief, then faith can go beyond the evidence in a way that belief
does not.
Suppose ﬁrst that faith entails belief. Most who have defended the view that faith
entails belief argue for a ‘belief-plus’ view of faith, on which faith is partially
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constituted by belief. On most versions of the ‘belief-plus’ view, faith is a subset
of our beliefs that meet certain other conditions, e.g. the ones towards which we
have an aﬀective attitude. If faith just is a kind of believing, and faith goes
beyond the evidence, then at least a subset of one’s beliefs does as well. Of
course, it is a leap from this to say that all beliefs go beyond the evidence, but
this model makes that conclusion much less of a bullet to bite. So, on the ‘belief
plus’ model, the conclusion that belief goes beyond the evidence is not surprising.
Suppose instead that faith does not entail belief. Then, faith can go beyond the
evidence in a way that belief does not, as faith may be even more steadfast in light
of counterevidence than belief. Defenders of the view that faith doesn’t entail belief
have argued that this can give faith a unique steadfastness in the face of counter-
evidence; one might receive counterevidence such that they can no longer ration-
ally believe p, but this need not rule out rational faith that p. For example,
suppose I get B-evidence for a proposition p that justiﬁes both faith and belief
that p. Then, I get signiﬁcant C-evidence against p, such that my credence that
p goes well below .. Assuming that rational credence well below . that p is
inconsistent with rational belief that p (lower the credence as you like), I can no
longer rationally believe that p. However, this may not rule out rational faith, if
faith does not entail belief. As Dan Howard Snyder () points out, I may
have other attitudes towards p that count toward faith that p: I accept that p, I
believe p is not especially improbable, I believe p is more likely than alternatives,
I desire that p, etc. Thus, on this view of faith, faith that p can be steadfast in light of
signiﬁcant evidence against p – potentially even more steadfast than belief. There
may still be some sense in which belief goes beyond the evidence, but faith does so
in a more drastic and signiﬁcant way.
Thus, I conclude that one way an attitude goes beyond the evidence is for that
attitude to be more sensitive to some parts of a body of evidence than other parts.
While this might entail that rational belief goes beyond the evidence, this is either
not surprising or occurs in a much more modest way than in the case of rational
faith.
Upshots and conclusion
There are several noteworthy features of faith that my view captures. First,
this picture of faith explains the personal aspect of faith. Many paradigm examples
of B-evidence are testimonial. Faith’s sensitivity to testimonial B-evidence more
than C-evidence explains why community and personal interaction is so important
to faith, and faith is a virtue and a vital characteristic of strong communities.
Further, a clear perception that p is also a paradigm example of B-evidence for
p, and this can explain the idea that perception and experience of God can lead
to rational religious faith. Thus, my view explains why having a tight-knit
religious community, a close relationship with God, and religious experiences
are important aspects of religious faith.
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Second, it is notable that many common objections to religious faith are based
on C-evidence. For example, the evidential problem of evil purportedly lowers the
probability of the existence of an all-good God, but is not B-evidence against God’s
existence. Some arguments against the existence of miracles are also plausibly
construed as C-evidence, insofar as they purport to lower the probability of a mira-
cle’s occurring, given the regular laws of nature we observe. Further, direct experi-
ences of God’s non-existence that would count as B-evidence for atheism seem
quite rare, if they occur at all.
Third, my account provides a picture that divides our epistemic lives into two
camps, putting credences, C-evidence, and statistical evidence in one epistemic
group, and belief, faith, and B-evidence in another epistemic group. One sugges-
tion is that we have two diﬀerent ‘epistemic toolboxes’, and which toolbox we use
depends on both our epistemic and practical situation. This further supports the
idea that belief and faith have a similar function, and this role is diﬀerent from the
role of credence and C-evidence.
Finally, some, such as Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder, have suggested that one
reason we have beliefs is because of our non-ideal cognitive state. While an ideal
agent might reason using only credences, beliefs are necessary because we do not
have the cognitive power to assign probabilities to every relevant proposition and
do the (large and complex) resulting calculation. (Recall that the notion of ration-
ality I am concerned with is how we ought to respond to evidence, given our
limited cognitive faculties.) Ross and Schroeder’s suggestion is, of course, contro-
versial, but it is potentially interesting when combined with my view of faith. One
might think faith is similar to belief in that it is a result our non-ideal cognitive
state. If we could access and perfectly assess all the relevant evidence for and
against a proposition, faith might not be necessary. There is some evidence
from religious texts that faith is necessary because of our cognitive limitations:
we ‘live by faith and not by sight’, and ‘now we see things imperfectly, like puz-
zling reﬂections in a mirror, but then we will see everything with perfect clarity’. I
commit myself to a mere conditional claim here: if beliefs are a result of our non-
ideal cognitive state, and faith and belief function similarly with respect to evi-
dence, it makes sense that faith would also be a result of our non-ideal cognitive
state.
In conclusion, I have argued that faith can both be rational and can also ‘go
beyond the evidence’. I have done so by arguing that rational belief is more sen-
sitive to some parts of a body of evidence than other parts, and that the same can
hold true for faith without compromising its rationality. I conclude that both
rational faith and rational belief are more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evi-
dence. That this is true of rational belief explains why evidence that a ticket will
lose the lottery and mere statistical evidence justify high credence but not belief.
That this is true of faith, I have argued, provides an account of how faith can be
both rational and go beyond the evidence. My hope is that my arguments in
this article can be a part of the solution to the problem of faith and reason.
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Notes
. Kant (/), .
. Kierkegaard ().
. I acknowledge there are delicate interpretative issues here, and I do not claim to give a full picture of
Kant’s or Kierkegaard’s views on faith.
. See Buchak (), , and Buchak ().
. Dawkins (), ; Harris (), .
. When I talk about probabilistic support in this article, the type of probability I have in mind is epistemic
probability, or the probability of some proposition given one’s evidence. For more on epistemic prob-
ability, see Goldstick () and Fumerton ().
. See Cohen (), , and Plantinga (), vii–viii.
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. See e.g. Buchak () and McKaughan ().
. Audi (), pt II. Audi actually distinguishes between seven kinds of faith, but these are the main three.
. Schwitzgebel ().
. See Staﬀel (). For other discussions of the lottery paradox, especially with respect to the relationship
between belief and credence, see Kyburg (); Foley (), ch. ; Nelkin (); Christensen (), ch. ;
Collins (); Sturgeon (); Kelp ().
. Staﬀel (). See Williamson (), .
. See Kelp () for an additional argument that it is irrational to believe lottery propositions. Horgan ()
also maintains one ought not to believe lottery propositions: ‘outright belief that one’s lottery ticket will lose
does not seem epistemically justiﬁed, no matter how high are the odds against winning’ (ibid., ).
. Buchak (). The case originates in Schauer (). See also Staﬀel ().
. See Cohen (), Thomson (), Colyvan et al. (), Enoch et al. (), Blome-Tillmann (), and
Idem ().
. Smith (), –.
. Ibid., –.
. See Smith (), Idem (). It is controversial whether maximal probabilistic support (i.e. to degree )
justiﬁes rational belief. Prima facie, it might seem that rational credence  that p entails rational belief that
p, but some, e.g. Moss (), have suggested there are cases of rational credence  without rational belief
().
. One might think that the answer is that rational agents do not form beliefs on the basis of statistical
evidence alone. While this suggestion gets many of the cases right, I argue that my account is superior in
Jackson (MS).
. Thanks to Blake Roeber. See Ross & Schroder (), . One might wonder in what sense B-evidence and
C-evidence are diﬀerent kinds of evidence. I remain agnostic on whether this is a metaphysically robust,
joint-carving distinction, but I do think that it has epistemic signiﬁcance. This account of the diﬀerence
between belief-generating and credence-generating evidence is further developed in Jackson (MS).
. See Lewis (), . See especially his ‘Rule of Attention’. For more on the role of salience in B-evidence
and C-evidence, see Jackson (MS).
. (.) is qualiﬁed because there may be exceptions to it, such as the following: suppose I know that the bus
arrives on time in % of cases, and on that basis, I believe it will arrive on time today. It is not obvious that
my belief is irrational, even though it has merely C-evidence in its favour. Sometimes, a low-stakes belief
with extremely good statistical evidence going for it seems at least rationally permissible, and (.) makes
room for that. For related cases see Pasnau (MS). Thanks to an anonymous referee.
. Thanks to an anonymous referee.
. Thanks to an anonymous referee.
. For a defence of the claim that religious experience can be evidentially signiﬁcant, see Alston ().
. At least, continuing to have propositional faith may no longer be rational. There may be other types of faith
(e.g. acts of faith) that could be rational in this situation.
. See Foley (), –. For defences of the Lockean Thesis, see ibid., ch. ; Christensen ();
Sturgeon (); Lin & Kelly (); Locke (); Dorst (); Fitelson & Shear (). For arguments
against the Lockean Thesis, see Smith (), Friedman (), Buchak (), Staﬀel (), Smith
(), Kelp ().
. See Buchak (), –, for more on faith and going beyond the evidence.
. See Mugg () and Malcolm & Scott () for defences of the belief-plus model.
. See Audi (), Alston (), Howard-Snyder (), Kvanvig (), Howard-Snyder (), Kvanvig
(), McKaughan (), Howard-Snyder (), and McKaughan () for defences of the claim that
faith does not entail belief. One might worry that this claim is in tension with things I’ve argued above; for
example, why do we need to give so much attention to rational belief for an understanding of rational
faith, if faith does not entail belief? In response, note that all I have argued above is that faith and belief
share a certain necessary condition that involves sensitivity to evidence. This need not rule out the idea
that it is possible to have faith that p without believing that p; the attitudes can otherwise come apart in
many ways. Thanks to an anonymous referee.
. See, e.g. Audi (), Howard-Snyder (), Idem (), McKaughan ().
. Especially when the content of the testimony is not hedged or statistical. However, this might depend on
one’s view of testimony. On certain reductionist views of testimony, it might be less straightforward that
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testimony is generally B-evidence. For example, if what grounds a testimonial belief is e.g. ‘S asserted p
and S is statistically reliable’, testimonial evidence begins to look like C-evidence. Thanks to an
anonymous referee.
. See Alston (), Turri (), West & Pelser ().
. Thanks to an anonymous referee.
. This is also supported by the ‘adaptive toolbox’model in psychology. See Payne et al. (), Gigerenzer &
Goldstein (), Gigerenzer et al. (), Payne & Bettman ().
. See Buchak (), Weisberg (forthcoming).
. See Foley (), ch. ; Ross & Schroeder (); Tang (); Weisberg (forthcoming).
. Ross & Schroeder (), –. See also Kaplan (); Maher (), ch. ; Staﬀel ().
.  Cor. : (English Standard Version).
.  Cor. : (New Living Translation).
. Thanks to Andrew Moon, Blake Roeber, Fritz Warﬁeld, John Keller, Lara Buchak, Ben Lennertz, Alan
Hajek, Jeﬀ Tolly, Ting Lau, Anne Jeﬀery, Nevin Climenhaga, Dustin Crummett, Ross Jensen, Rebecca
Chan, Anne Jeﬀrey, Julia Staﬀel, Robert Audi, Daniel Nolan, Andy Rogers, Ian Huyett, Miriam Hickman,
Blake Roeber’s Doxastic Voluntarism seminar, the Notre Dame epistemology reading group, audiences at
the  St. Thomas Summer Seminar,  Society for Christian Philosophers Eastern Regional Meeting,
the  Indiana Philosophical Association, the  Kaufman Interfaith Institute Workshop, and several
anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions that improved this article in many ways.
 E L I ZABE TH J ACKSON
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412518000446
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 73.144.84.180, on 07 May 2019 at 12:53:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
